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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Aside from natural disasters, when tragedy strikes – taking its toll in fatalities and 
serious injuries – we ordinarily look to the tort system for redress.  Tort is not the 
exclusive form of redress, of course, in this era of private insurance and government 
disability programs.2  But still, it remains our most highly visible mechanism for 
assigning responsibility and providing compensation.  So, we ordinarily look to tort. 
But there was nothing “ordinary” about September 11.  And that includes how 
our legal system responded to the plight of injury victims of that horrific day.  
Within less than two weeks of September 11, Congress took action, funding a special 
compensation scheme for the victims and survivors of the terrorist acts entitled the 
September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001 (hereinafter Victim 
Compensation Fund or Fund), which provides “no-fault” benefits; that is, 
compensation for physical harm without the necessity of establishing wrongful 
conduct as a basis for recovery.3 
                                                                
1A. Calder Mackay Professor of Law, Stanford Law School.  My appreciation to Barrett 
Hester, Stanford Law School Class of 2003, for research assistance, and to Dean Steven 
Steinglass and the Cleveland-Marshall College of Law faculty for generous hospitality and 
exchange of ideas during my stay as Visiting Scholar, March 2002.  Special thanks to 
Professor David Goshien, Chair of the Cleveland-Marshall Fund Visiting Scholar Program. 
2See Kenneth S. Abraham & Lance Liebman, Private Insurance, Social Insurance, and 
Tort Reform: Toward a New Vision of Compensation for Illness and Injury, 93 COLUM. L. 
REV. 75 (1993). 
3Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, § 405(b)(2), 
115 Stat. 230, 239-40 (2001).  The provision of no-fault benefits – i.e., benefits recoverable 
without the necessity of establishing “fault” – was critical for two reasons.  First and most 
obviously, the clearly responsible parties, the terrorists and their sponsors, are not a realistic 
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The Victim Compensation Fund has a singular character, reflecting the 
singularity of the event that led to its enactment.  The early days, indeed the early 
weeks, following September 11 were marked by confusion and shock over what had 
befallen the nation.  In that period – more precisely just eleven days after the event – 
the Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act was enacted, establishing 
the Victim Compensation Fund.4  Not surprisingly, perhaps, the design of the Fund 
reflected the confusion and conflicting sentiment about how to address the nation’s 
deepest anxieties about what had happened: The massive loss of life, and the 
prospect of total paralysis, or collapse, of our national air transportation system. 
In this Article, I will begin by describing the approach to compensation taken in 
the Victim Compensation Fund.  I will then discuss the implementing regulations 
promulgated by the Special Master appointed under the Fund.  Next, I will offer a 
preliminary assessment of the significance of the Fund for the survivors of those who 
perished, as well as the seriously injured.5  And finally, I will speculate more broadly 
about the significance of the Fund for how we address the continuing problem of 
compensating victims of unexpected harm.6 
II.  THE DESIGN OF THE VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND 
A.  Why a Fund? 
Congressionally enacted no-fault compensation legislation is a sufficiently 
uncommon event to trigger the question: Why action by Congress to establish a 
fund?  After all, terrorist events as well-publicized as the Lockerbie airline disaster, 
the Oklahoma City bombing, and the earlier World Trade Center explosion failed to 
generate government compensation efforts at the time.7  More generally, the most 
comprehensive no-fault schemes addressing nationwide injury tolls of substantial 
proportion – workers’ compensation and auto no-fault – have been adopted at the 
state level, rather than through Congressional action.  Moreover, although federal no-
                                                          
source of compensation.  Second, establishing tort liability on the part of the airlines or other 
potential defendants, while not out of the question, is fraught with difficulties, as I will discuss 
infra, Part IV.  As of this writing, the toll of fatalities from the terrorist acts is 3,025.  See Eric 
Lipton, Death Toll is Near 3,000, but Some Uncertainty Over the Count Remains, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 11, 2002, at G47. 
4Id. at § 401-409. 
5This Article, which is based on my Cleveland-Marshall Fund Lecture on March 21, 2002, 
offers a preliminary assessment only.  The Special Master’s implementation of the Victim 
Compensation Fund through the determination of individual claims is still at an early stage as 
I write. 
6In another article, Robert L. Rabin, Indeterminate Future Harm in the Context of 
September 11, 88 VA. L. REV. 1831 (2002), I discuss the potential future claims of exposure-
only victims of September 11 and its aftermath.  The next section of this Article, describing 
the design of the Fund, is substantially the same as the corresponding section in the exposure-
only victims article, but otherwise the two articles address distinct aspects of the Fund with 
this rticle focusing on the treatment of claims for physical harm.   
7See David W. Chen, Many Relatives, Wary and Anguished, Shun Sept. 11 Fund, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 1, 2002, at B1. 
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fault schemes have been enacted, they have been a relative rarity.8  In fact, the most 
notable of the federal schemes appear to have reflected Congressional perceptions of 
emergency circumstances, triggered by industry threats of withdrawal from critical 
areas of product manufacture and service provision under the specter of catastrophic 
tort liability.  In particular, no-fault compensation for childhood vaccine injuries, and 
quasi-no-fault coverage for nuclear energy-related accidents under the Price-
Anderson Act fit this scenario of sensitivity to political exigencies.9 
It is possible to view the adoption of the Fund from a similar perspective.  In the 
immediate aftermath of September 11, the airline industry appeared on the brink of 
collapse, as passenger travel dropped precipitously and menacing storm clouds of 
future tort claims loomed on the not-so-distant horizon.  In this scenario, Congress, 
in the course of bailing out the airline industry through subsidies and limitations on 
liability, could do no less than offer a quid pro quo to the air crash victims in the 
form of a compensation scheme.10 
This seems to me an excessively realpolitik view.  As a spontaneous reaction to 
September 11, charitable giving in the private sector reached unprecedented levels.11 
                                                                
8See MARC A. FRANKLIN & ROBERT L. RABIN, TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES 841-50 (7th 
ed. 2001) (surveying federal forays into no-fault compensation schemes). 
9See Robert L. Rabin, Some Thoughts on the Efficacy of a Mass Toxics Administrative 
Compensation Scheme, 52 MD. L. REV. 951, 955 (1993) (commenting that Congress passed 
the Price-Anderson Act, which provided coverage for nuclear energy-related accidents, “with 
the express intent of encouraging investment in nuclear energy research and operations by a 
private sector daunted by the prospect of multimillion-dollar claims and a constrained 
insurance market”); id. at 958 (explaining that Congress passed the National Childhood 
Vaccine Injury Act of 1986 “in response to the concerns of the vaccine manufacturers, who 
had threatened to withdraw from the market because of anxieties about the possibility of 
crushing liability resulting from the infrequent but unavoidable injuries from exposure to 
vaccines”); see also the Swine Flu Act, 42 U.S.C. § 247b(j)(1) (1976) (amending the Federal 
Tort Claims Act to allow those injured by the swine flu vaccine to bring suit against the 
federal government rather than manufacturers or distributors of the vaccine).  
10See Lizette Alvarez & Stephen Labaton, A Nation Challenged: The Bailout; An Airline 
Bailout, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2001, at A1. 
11Total estimated contributions, one year after the event, were roughly $2.7 billion.  See 
Stephanie Strom, A Cloud Spreads Over Charities as Billions in Gifts Come With a Critical 
Look, NY TIMES, Sept. 11, 2002, at A32.  The most sizable of the September 11th charities 
have collected and disbursed funds in the hundreds of millions of dollars.  By the end of April 
2002, the American Red Cross’s Liberty Disaster Fund had raised more than $966 million and 
had distributed $567.5 million to Sept. 11 victims.  Jacqueline L. Salmon, Red Cross 
Headquarters Laying Off 100; Cutbacks Not Tied to Sept. 11 Fallout, Spokesman Says, WASH. 
POST, Apr. 30, 2002, at B5.  After the Sept. 11 Fund had received $425 million dollars, fund 
managers began to recommend that people donate to other causes. At the end of January, it 
had already distributed $160 million. See Anne-Marie O’Connor, Sept. 11 Fund Says Send 
Gifts to Charities in Need, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2002, at A5.  The third-largest Sept. 11 fund, 
the Twin Towers Fund, had raised a total of $148 million. David Barstow and David M. 
Herszenhorn, Guiliani to Give Money Quickly In Shift on Twin Towers Charity, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 27, 2002, at A1.  Even the smaller new charities that sprung up in the wake of September 
11 had received substantial donations.  “[T]heir connection to September 11 has given them a 
platform that most start-up charities lack.  Contributions large and small, mostly unsolicited, 
have poured into their coffers.” Domenica Marchetti, September 11 Charities Face Challenges 
Beyond the Ordinary, CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY, Mar. 7, 2002, at 11.  Total estimated 
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2001
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Indeed, by mid-January, 2002, a manager of the September 11 Fund, which had $425 
million in its coffers at that point, appealed to the public to redirect donations to 
other worthy charitable causes that had suffered precipitous drop-offs in 
contributions after the terrorist acts.12  Similar manifestations of sympathy for the 
victims, characterizing them as heroes who died for their country as in warfare, were 
reflected at sporting events, in memorial gatherings, and in the mass media.13 
There is no reason to think that members of Congress, who endorsed the Fund 
with acclaim just two weeks after the event, at the high tide of emotional response to 
September 11, were immune to these sentiments.  In short, the Fund was created 
under singular circumstances.  Rather than reflecting a political trade-off designed to 
quell workplace unrest (black lung, workers’ compensation), or to provide liability 
assurances to an industry (vaccine, Price-Anderson), the Fund was conceived at least 
in part as a grant of largess to the survivors of those who had unwittingly served as 
surrogates, stand-ins, for the rest of the American people.   
These considerations partially explain the structure of the Fund.  At the same 
time, however, the Fund does reflect both its inextricable connection to Congress’s 
correlative desire to protect the airline industry, and its inescapable lineage as, in the 
final analysis, a no-fault plan, not a mini-version of the tort system.14  Hence, its 
curious hybrid structure, which I will next describe. 
B.  A Design Reflecting Cross-Purposes? 
At its core, the Fund reflects the love-hate relationship the American public has 
with its tort system.  One key theme in the Fund is the resolution of claims with 
dispatch, avoiding the years of delay and uncertainty that are taken to be the plight of 
injury victims who must seek recourse through tort.  Under the Fund, all claims are 
to be determined within 120 days of filing,15 and payments are to be made within 20 
days of determination.16  These determinations, along with all other guidelines for 
decision, procedural and substantive, are to be made by a Special Master, designated 
by the Attorney General to administer the Fund.17  Moreover, and significantly, the 
                                                          
contributions, as of a year after the event, reached $2.7 billion.  Ground Zero: Charity, A 
Flood of Money, Then a Deluge of Scrutiny For Those Handing It Out, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 
2002 at B5. 
12See O’Connor, supra note 11, at A10; see also Anne Marie Chaker, Red Cross Gives 
Disaster Relief to Tony Enclave, WALL ST. J., Feb. 7, 2002, at B1 (detailing the difficulties the 
Red Cross faced in finding more recipients for its charity).  
13The Salt Lake City Winter Olympics commenced only after “[a]n honor guard of U.S. 
Olympic athletes, accompanied by New York City fire and police officers, carried the tattered 
World Trade Center flag to the center of Rice-Eccles Stadium.”  Richard Ernsberger Jr., 
Showtime in Salt Lake, NEWSWEEK INT’L, Feb. 18, 2002, at 46.  Memorial services and 
gatherings were also held in great profusion. Richard C. Dujardin, 2001: A Year to Test Our 
Faith, PROVIDENCE J., Dec. 29, 2001, at D01.   
14I discuss the structure of the Fund from a political economy perspective in Rabin, supra 
note 6, at 1867-69.  
15Air Transportation Safety Act § 405(b)(3). 
16Id. at § 406(a). 
17Id. at § 404. 
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determinations by the Special Master are final and not subject to judicial review.18  
While attorney representation of claimants is allowed, and a right to a hearing is 
provided,19 the system is clearly meant to fast-track claims, with a minimum of 
legalistic maneuvering.  Indeed, no explicit provision is included for defensive 
representation on behalf of the Fund to safeguard against false or overstated claims. 
The quest for speedy resolution of claims is further buttressed by the supporting 
structure of time limitations on filings, reinforcing the theme of reaching closure 
with dispatch on claims arising out of the events of September 11.  The Special 
Master was to adopt implementing regulations within ninety days of the statute’s 
enactment, devising a procedural system for resolving claims and giving further 
content to the broad definitions of compensable harm20 – and that latter date, in turn, 
triggered a two-year period in which all claims under the Act were to be filed.21 
This drive to achieve rapid closure can be taken to reflect the singularity of the 
events of September 11 as a catalyst.  In sharp contrast to existing systems of no-
fault compensation, the Fund addresses injuries arising out of a single set of related 
events, rather than an ongoing course of risk-related activity.  If anything, this 
contrast underscores the disenchantment with tort.  Ordinarily, catastrophic injury 
“events” are grist for the tort mill.22  Even though tort remains an option, the Fund 
can implicitly be viewed as a statement of the perceived inadequacies of the tort 
remedy for meeting the call for an immediate response to the needs of the September 
11 victims.23 
Critics of tort, of course, would point not only to the system’s delay but also to its 
indeterminacy, in particular from a compensation perspective.24  Within limits, the 
                                                                
18Id. at § 405(b)(3). 
19Id. at § 405(b)(4). 
20Air Transportation Safety Act § 407. 
21Id. at § 405(a)(3). 
22See Deborah R. Hensler and Mark A. Peterson, Understanding Mass Personal Injury 
Litigation: A Socio-Legal Analysis, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 961, 972 (1993) (discussing the tort 
response to the 1981 collapse of two skywalks onto a crowded dance floor at the Kansas City 
Hyatt Regency); see id. at 975 (treating the more than 1,000 wrongful death and personal 
injury claims filed in the aftermath of the 1980 fire at the MGM-Grand Hotel in Las Vegas).   
23It is critical to note that the inadequacy of tort can be taken, in part, to be self-generated 
by the cap on liability established in the Act.  See infra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.  
24These sentiments were echoed in Congressional discussion of the Act, which included 
several statements about tort law’s shortcomings in general and in this particular case.  For 
example, after criticizing the tort system more generally, Senator McCain concluded: 
No amount of money can begin to compensate the victims [of September 11th] for 
their suffering.  Nothing will make them and their families “whole.”  It is not the 
intent of the federal fund to do this. Nor is it the intent of the fund to duplicate the 
arbitrary, wildly divergent awards that sometimes come from our deeply flawed tort 
system-awards from which up to one third or more of the victims' award is often taken 
by attorneys.  
The intent of the fund is to ensure that the victims of this unprecedented, 
unforeseeable, and horrific event, and their families do not suffer financial hardship in 
addition to the terrible hardships they already have been forced to endure. 
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2001
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Fund is meant to create baseline assurance that victims of physical injury and their 
survivors will receive benefits.  More precisely, the Fund establishes eligibility for 
individuals “present at [any of the three crash sites] at the time, or in the immediate 
aftermath, of the terrorist-related aircraft crashes,”25 and who “suffered physical 
harm or death” as a result of the crashes.26  For this circumscribed class, the Fund 
provides benefits for both economic and non-economic losses. 
In spelling out those benefits, however, the Fund appears to do a dramatic about-
face from its foregoing rejection of tort precepts.  Economic loss is defined to 
include not just medical expenses and loss of present earnings, but “loss of business 
or employment opportunities” – presumably future lost income – “to the extent 
recovery for such loss is allowed under applicable state law.”27  And non-economic 
loss is broadly defined to include “losses for physical and emotional pain, suffering, 
inconvenience, physical impairment, mental anguish, disfigurement, loss of 
enjoyment of life, loss of society and companionship, loss of consortium (other than 
loss of domestic service), hedonic damages, injury to reputation, and all other 
nonpecuniary losses of any kind or nature.”28  Interestingly, no parallel to the 
economic loss definition that referenced “[as] allowed under applicable state law” is 
included in this latter definition of non-economic loss.  Nonetheless, the pervasive 
influence of the tort perspective of doing individualized justice – disparaged by 
critics of the system, trumpeted by its advocates – is apparent on the face of the 
provision. 
But there is one substantial qualification to this apparent generosity of spirit.  
Another bane of the existence of tort system critics is the collateral source rule, 
which allows for the recovery in tort of out-of-pocket expenses even if they have 
been reimbursed by “collateral” sources such as health and disability insurance.  
Under the Fund, there is no recovery for these items.29  Indeed, the restriction on 
“double recovery,” as tort critics would put it, is written in exceedingly broad terms 
to cover “all collateral sources, including life insurance, pension funds, death benefit 
programs, and payments by Federal, State, or local governments related to the 
terrorist-related aircraft crashes….”30   
So, the Fund steers a somewhat uncertain course between collective principles 
that would emphasize timely compensation and filling the gaps of unmet need, on 
the one hand, and individualized recovery that would pull in the direction of the tort 
model, on the other.  Before examining this tension in somewhat more detail, 
                                                          
147 CONG. REC. S9589, S9594 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 2001) (statement of Rep. McCain).  Senator 
Boxer likewise implicitly invoked concerns about the tort system’s delay by suggesting that 
she supported “a victim's compensation fund to help ensure that victims’ families receive 
compensation in a timely fashion.”  Id. at S9593. 
25Air Transportation Safety Act § 405(c)(2)(A)(i). 
26Id. at § 405(c)(2)(A)(ii). 
27Id. at § 402(5). 
28Id. at § 402(7). 
29Nor is it possible to recover punitive damages under the Fund.  See Air Transportation 
Safety Act § 405(b)(5). 
30Id. at § 402(4).  In treating life insurance and pension funds as “primary,” the Fund 
departs from the parameters of other no-fault schemes.  
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol49/iss4/3
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however, consider the escape hatch provided in the Act – the prospect of lodging a 
tort claim instead of proceeding under the Fund. 
C.  Tort: A Meaningful Option? 
The tort option under the Act, once again, reflects the ambivalence of Congress 
towards the tort system.  Congress might have decided, of course, to treat the Fund 
as the exclusive remedy for September 11 victims – or, at least, the exclusive remedy 
for those victims eligible for benefits under the Fund.  In doing so, it could have 
pointed to the most longstanding no-fault model, workers’ compensation, where tort 
recovery is precluded to injured workers in claims falling within the coverage of the 
no-fault scheme.31  Instead, under the Fund, a tort remedy is provided as an option 
for eligible claimants who choose to waive their right to seek no-fault benefits.32  
One can only speculate about why tort was left open to prospective claimants; 
perhaps in recognition of the fact that some victims with substantial collateral source 
recoveries – most notably, victims with major life insurance holdings, accrued 
pension benefits, or accidental death coverage – might well have anticipated no 
recoverable benefits under the Fund.33  Or realistically, Congress may have simply 
recognized that substantial categories of September 11 victims – most clearly, those 
suffering property damage and psychological harm without accompanying physical 
injury – were simply not covered by the Fund.34  Of course, tort, as the default 
system, would have been available for addressing these claims – how successfully is 
another matter – without the need for establishing a federal cause of action in the 
Act.  But this would arguably have created the appearance of treating Fund 
beneficiaries as second-class citizens if they were offered no tort option. 
Whatever the case, Congress’s ambivalent embrace of tort is highlighted by the 
title of section 408, which creates the federal cause of action: “Limitation on Air 
Carrier Liability.”35  If Congress was determined to leave tort as an option, it was 
equally determined to constrain tort along lines familiar to observers of late twentieth 
century tort reform.  The Act establishes a ceiling on tort liability of the air carriers, 
providing that liability “shall not be in an amount greater than the limits of the 
liability coverage maintained by the air carrier.”36  In subsequent legislation, this 
                                                                
31The bar on tort suits generally only extends to the employer.  Workers injured on the job 
remain free to sue third parties in tort, whose conduct contributed to their workplace injuries.  
The suits frequently involve claims for injury from allegedly defective machinery in the 
workplace that causes injury to the employee.  For coverage of the topic, see MARC A. 
FRANKLIN AND ROBERT L. RABIN, TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES 614-31 (7th ed. 2001). 
32Air Transportation Safety Act § 405(c)(3)(B)(i). 
33See supra notes 29-30, and accompanying text.  Note, however, that the Special Master 
softened the offset provision in the Final Rule.  See infra note 57. 
34See the statute’s provision identifying a claimant as an individual who has “suffered 
physical harm or death.”  Air Transportation Safety Act § 405(c)(2)(A)(ii).  In addition, the 
Special Master’s decisions were made final, with no recourse to judicial review.  Air 
Transportation Safety Act § 405(b)(3).  
35Id. at § 408. 
36Id. at § 408(a).  The amount of insurance coverage was $1.5 billion per plane.  See Jim 
VandeHei and Milo Geyelin, Economic Impact: Bush Seeks to Limit Liability of Companies 
Sued as Result of Attacks, WALL ST. J., Oct. 25, 2001, at A6. 
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protective cap on liability, linking it to the limits of insurance coverage, was carried 
over to aircraft manufacturers, property owners in the World Trade Center, airport 
owners, and governmental entities.37 
Ceilings aside, exclusive jurisdiction to hear “all actions brought for any claim 
(including any claim for loss of property, personal injury, or death) resulting from or 
relating to the terrorist-related aircraft crashes” is located in the federal district court 
for the Southern District of New York.38  However, no federal common law is 
created; rather, the court is to apply the substantive law of the state in which the 
crash occurred.39  Finally, just to leave no doubt about it, section 408(b)(1) declares 
that the federal cause of action is to be “the exclusive remedy for damages arising 
out of the hijacking and subsequent crashes of such flights.”40 
Thus, claimants eligible under the Fund are put to a choice: they must elect either 
to claim benefits under the Fund, or to waive their rights and pursue a tort claim.41  
At the same time, for those falling outside the eligibility limits of the Fund, tort, as 
circumscribed in the Act, remains available.   
D.  Ambivalence Reconsidered 
This, then, is the basic structure of the Fund and the tort option.  One is left with 
a fundamental question: Is the Fund, on the one hand, grounded in a collective model 
emphasizing needs-based benefits for a community of victims?  Or, is it grounded in 
an individual entitlements model of compensating for harm on a case-by-case basis 
(a paler version of tort)?  As the previous discussion indicates, there is evidence 
pointing in both directions.42 
In support of a needs-based model, there is initially the choice of no-fault, in and 
of itself.  While no-fault schemes are not narrowly needs-based, they are premised on 
the notion that compensation for basic economic harm suffered is the first order of 
business, and that considerations of defendant misconduct and plaintiff contributory 
carelessness (fault and comparative fault) are largely irrelevant.  In other words, that 
injury arising out of a given activity or event is in itself a sufficient condition to 
warrant redress.43  This seems to square with the underlying premise of the Victim 
                                                                
37See Title II—“Liability Limitation” of the subsequent compromise Aviation and 
Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, § 201(b)(2), 115 Stat. 597, 645 (2001).  It is 
noteworthy, however, that the same act refused to limit the liability of companies supplying 
airport security: “Nothing in this section shall in any way limit any liability of any person who 
is engaged in the business of providing air transportation security and who is not an airline or 
airport sponsor or director, officer, or employee of an airline or airport sponsor.”  Id. at 
§ 201(b)(3). 
38Air Transportation Safety Act § 408(b)(3) 
39Id. at § 408(b)(2). 
40Id. at § 408(b)(1). 
41Id. at § 405(c)(3)(B). 
42It should be noted that there is virtually no legislative history to serve as guidance on the 
provisions of the Fund.  
43On the irrelevance of fault considerations and the activity-based nexus for claims, see 
generally ORRIN KRAMER & RICHARD BRIFFAULT, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION: STRENGTHENING 
THE SOCIAL COMPACT at 13 (1991).  The high priority given to basic economic harm is 
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol49/iss4/3
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Compensation Fund, disavowing “fault” as a prerequisite for recovery.  In addition, 
the treatment of collateral sources – the striking set-off provision for “all collateral 
source compensation, including life insurance, pension funds [and other government 
benefit schemes]” – further supports this horizontal equity/needs-based reading of 
the Fund objectives.44  Finally, there is the retention of the tort option.  If a true 
option in the strong sense, tort might well have been taken to be meant as an 
individual rights pathway for those choosing to forgo the contrasting collectively-
based welfare scheme. 
On the other hand, the Fund provisions offer clear support for an individual 
entitlements model reading.  To begin with, the scheme defines “economic loss” to 
include future lost earnings as interpreted in applicable state law.  This interpretive 
approach presumably anticipates case-by-case projections of the future earning 
power of the particular claimant.  In the same vein, the definition of “non-economic 
loss” to include unlimited pain and suffering, loss of consortium, and “all other 
[intangible loss] of any kind” is a straightforward invitation to assess harm case-by-
case.  Indeed, the notion of subjectively redressing non-economic loss is inherently 
at odds with the collective, insurance-based principles underlying no-fault.45  And 
finally, the overall cap on liability in tort at insurance limits combined with the likely 
prospect that non-Fund based tort claims (especially for property damage) might 
seriously limit recovery for personal harm in tort could be taken as indirect evidence 
that a measure of complementary individualization was anticipated in the no-fault 
scheme.46  In other words, if claimants were to be coerced into no-fault by 
circumstances beyond their control, they should get some approximation of what tort 
would ordinarily have to offer.  
If nothing else, these cross-cutting themes assured a critical role for the Special 
Master in setting the stage for implementation of the Fund through interpretive 
guidelines.  I turn next to his efforts in developing these guidelines. 
                                                          
illustrated in the auto no-fault context by the New York no-fault statute, among the most 
generous, which explicitly allows recovery only for “basic economic loss” (up to $50,000).  
See N.Y. INS. LAW § 5102(a) (McKinney 1995).  In the workers’ compensation context, the 
focus on basic economic loss is demonstrated by the caps on recovery for lost wages at modest 
levels in death and serious injury cases, as well as the exclusion of noneconomic loss from 
compensable harm.  See infra note 59 and accompanying text; LARSON, infra note 60.  
44September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. 66,274, 66,287, 
(proposed Dec. 21, 2001) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 104) (emphasis added).  Indeed, the 
italicized terms underscore the possibility of reading the provision to offset private charitable 
contributions, as well.  This possibility raised a sufficient outcry to trigger an early assurance 
from the Special Master that such private contributions would not be taken into account in 
determining awards.  See Putting a Price on a Life, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 10, 2002, at C8. 
45Still, even no-fault schemes that replace tort in its entirety sometimes retain scheduled 
pain and suffering.  See Stephen Todd, Privatization of Accident Compensation: Policy and 
Politics in New Zealand, 39 WASHBURN L.J. 404 (2000) (examining New Zealand’s 
experience with a comprehensive no-fault accident compensation scheme). 
46See Geraldine Baum & Josh Meyer, Final Rules on Sept. 11 Fund Give Families More 
Money, Victims, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2002, at A1. 
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III.  IMPLEMENTING THE FUND: GUIDELINES  
When the Special Master, Kenneth Feinberg, was appointed on November 26, 
2001, his initial task was to promulgate regulations resolving the principal tensions 
in the Act and filling in some important blanks.47  He tested the waters by issuing a 
set of draft regulations (“Interim Final Rule”) for commentary on December 21, 
2001.48  Subsequently, on March 8, 2002, he issued final regulations (“Final Rule”) 
spelling out his interpretations of Fund provisions.49 
Feinberg’s reading of the main provisions of the Fund reveals an interesting 
effort to strike a balance between understanding the Act in traditional no-fault terms 
that would have emphasized meeting scheduled basic loss of victims, and 
interpreting the Act in an open-ended fashion that essentially would have offered 
tort-type, individualized compensation in a no-fault setting.  His manner of resolving 
this tension is evident in the approach taken to the three key substantive benefit 
provisions: collateral source offset (i.e., the reductions in awards for outside 
benefits), economic loss, and non-economic loss. 
A.  Collateral Source Offset  
A threshold issue left unresolved by the language of the Act was whether private 
charitable contributions received by victims and their survivors would be offset 
against Fund benefits.  As indicated above, the Act provided that “all” collateral 
sources “including” life insurance, pension, and public welfare schemes were to be 
deducted from benefits under the Fund.50  A literal reading of this proviso might well 
have included, by implication, private charitable benefits as a set-off.  Consequently, 
as contributions swelled into the multi-millions and beyond, there was a distinct 
possibility that an offset of private contributions funneled to survivors would lead to 
virtually no recovery at all from the Fund for a substantial number of families, 
particularly when aggregated (as a set-off) with life insurance and pension offsets 
explicitly required by the Act.51  Not surprisingly, a huge outcry arose in light of this 
possibility.52 
The Special Master responded with alacrity in his Interim Final Rule, indicating 
that there would be no offset for private charitable contributions.53  As a practical 
matter, political considerations aside, the offset of private charitable contributions 
might well have created chaos simply because the major private September 11 
                                                                
47See Diana B. Henriques & David Barstow, A Nation Challenged: The Special Master; 
Mediator Named to Run Sept. 11 Fund, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2001, at B1. 
48September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. 66,274 (proposed 
Dec. 21, 2001) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 104) [hereinafter Interim Final Rule]. 
49September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 67 Fed. Reg. 11,233 (Mar. 13, 
2002) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 104) [hereinafter Final Rule]. 
50Air Transportation Safety Act § 405(b)(6). 
51See Diana B. Henriques, A Nation Challenged: The Federal Fund; Official Vows All 
Families of Victims Will Get Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2001, at B7. 
52See Diana B. Henriques, A Nation Challenged: Compensation; Victims’ Families Get 
Break on Earlier Charity, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2001, at B7. 
53Interim Final Rule, supra note 48, § 104.47(b)(2). 
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charities were virtually paralyzed in the early months – experiencing management 
and distributional issues of staggering magnitude.54  While these problems were 
ironed out to some extent as time passed, it was by no means clear that it would have 
been possible to account for private benefits received and receivable by Fund-
eligible claimants at the time when Feinberg issued his regulations. 
Nonetheless, as just mentioned, the Act explicitly called for the offset of life 
insurance and pension benefits – and here too, there was an outcry from victims’ 
families (in particular, the well-endowed) that they were likely to receive nothing in 
Fund benefits because of the foresight of the deceased, who it was argued, had 
earned or set aside funds for such a contingency.55  These protests were sharpened to 
a fine point by prospective claimants observing that unconstrained tort – the absence 
of a Fund – would be a superior option, since life insurance and pension benefits 
traditionally are not offset under the tort system.56 
Once again, the Special Master responded to the criticism, this time in the Final 
Rule, by interpreting the Act to allow reduction of the offset to the extent of victims’ 
self-contributions.57  More generally, Feinberg announced that it would be “very 
rare” for any eligible claimant to receive less than $250,000.58  It should be noted 
that neither of these interpretive moves is grounded in the language of the Act.   
Rather, the Special Master’s actions reflected a fundamental philosophical 
difference buried in the esoteric legal language of collateral offset.  On the one hand, 
a need-based approach to compensation would point to full offset of all collateral 
sources, as the Act appeared to require, since these benefits do contribute to meeting 
basic needs.  On the other hand, under an individual claimant-focused tort-type 
inquiry as to the “deserving” status of the victim, offsets arguably would be ignored 
entirely.  In the end, the Special Master arrived at something of a compromise, 
liberalizing the statute from the victims’ perspective by reducing the offset through 
recognition of victims’ contributions and entirely ignoring outside private charity 
received by Fund-eligible claimants. 
B.  Economic Loss 
As mentioned, in addressing economic loss, the Act appears to be at cross-
purposes with the literal terms of the collateral source offset provision in referring to 
recovery of “loss of business or employment opportunities” as defined in state tort 
law.59  On its face, this would seem to suggest an individualized inquiry in every case 
into the lifetime earnings prospects of each deceased victim.  Inquiries of this sort are 
entirely at odds with the traditional no-fault approach of scheduled benefits reflecting 
social welfare goals of categorical treatment of those suffering serious injury or 
                                                                
54See, e.g., Myron Levin, Flood of Sept. 11 Aid Swamps Charities, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 8, 
2001, § 1, at 1; See also Ground Zero, supra note 11, at B5. 
55See Henriques, supra note 52, at B7. 
56This assumes, of course, that liability would have been possible to establish in tort.  See 
infra notes 74-78, and accompanying text. 
57See supra note 49, § 104.47. 
58See supra note 49, at 11,234 (Statement by the Special Master). 
59Air Transportation Safety Act § 402(5). 
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death, and generally capping recoveries at levels approximating statewide median 
wage earnings.60 
In the Final Rule, the Special Master again devised a compromise.  While there is 
no mention of scheduling in the statute, Feinberg established a grid applicable to the 
range of potential claimants: a “presumed economic loss” schedule based on age, 
size of family, and recent past earnings, along with a cap applicable to the upper 2% 
of income earners.61  In devising this strategy, he provided for awards that 
recognized very considerable future earnings disparities, an announced range of 
$300,000 to $4.35 million.  But at the same time, he rejected an approach that would 
have recognized entirely open-ended, case-by-case speculation about future earnings 
prospects.62 
C.  Non-Economic Loss  
Although there are exceptions, no-fault schemes typically do not provide for 
individualized pain and suffering loss, apart from optional or supplemental recourse 
to tort.63  In fact, tort law itself, as encapsulated in wrongful death statutes, did not 
traditionally provide any pain and suffering loss for survivors – that is, loss of 
companionship.64  Indeed, many states still do not recognize non-pecuniary loss as 
compensable to survivors in tort, limiting recovery to economic loss.65  And some 
                                                                
60Death benefits are typically calculated as a fixed percentage of the decedent’s average 
weekly wage, which is capped at a level that varies from state to state, but generally 
approximates the average weekly wage in the state.  See U.S. Dept. of Labor, State Workers’ 
Compensation Laws, 2001, available at www.dol.gov/esa/regs/statutes/owcp/stwclaw/tables - 
pdf/table-12.pdf (last visited Sept. 4, 2002); see also AFL-CIO, Workers’ Compensation 
Comparisons, 2001, at http://www.aflcio.org/safety/compcomp.htm (last visited Sept. 4, 
2002). See generally 5 LEX K. LARSON, LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW § 93.01 
(2000) (“The beginning point in calculating the amount of benefits is the ‘average weekly 
wage.’ This, when the fixed statutory percentage of roughly between one-half and two-thirds 
has been applied to it, becomes the unit of benefit by which practically all compensation . . . is 
measured, subject to maximum and minimum limits.”).  In many states, including New York, 
the surviving spouse continues to receive the weekly benefit during the entire period of the 
widow/widowerhood, which continues until the surviving spouse remarries or dies.  Some 
states, however, impose limits on the duration (e.g., 500 weeks in Michigan) or the total dollar 
amount (e.g. $160,000 in California) of the death benefits. 5 LEX K. LARSON, LARSON’S 
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW § 98.03[1]; 10 LARSON App. B-16; N.Y. WORKERS’ COMP. 
§ 16 (McKinney 2002); Cal. Lab. Code § 4702 (West 2002).  For the New York schedule of 
benefits for serious injuries (permanent partial disability), see New York Workers’ 
Compensation Law § 15 (1991). 
61Final Rule, supra note 49, § 104.43. 
62See Putting a Value on Lives, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2002, at A26. 
63See, e.g., 1 LEX K. LARSON, LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW § 1.03[4] (2000) 
(“There is no place in [workers’] compensation law for damages on account of pain or 
suffering, however dreadful they may be.”). 
64See, e.g., Liff v. Schildkrout, 404 N.E.2d 1288 (N.Y. 1980). 
65See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 297 (2001).  
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other states, such as California, refuse to recognize pain and suffering of the 
deceased victim prior to death as recoverable in tort.66  
Nonetheless, the Special Master provided for scheduled non-economic benefit 
awards under the Fund, for each victim and every surviving eligible family member.  
In the Interim Final Rule, $250,000 was to be awarded for each victim; a figure that 
remained unchanged in the Final Rule.67  With respect to survivors, the Interim Final 
Rule provided $50,000 for the spouse and each dependent, a figure that was 
increased to $100,000 in the Final Rule.68  Thus, a surviving spouse with two 
children would receive benefits of $550,000 for non-economic loss in a claim under 
the Fund. 
D.  Resolving Tensions: A Perspective 
The game plan for implementation that emerges from the Fund and its 
subsequent interpretation in the Final Rule can be seen as a curious hybrid: one foot 
in no-fault precepts and the other in tort principles.  Neither the Fund provisions nor 
the implementing regulations can be read, however, apart from the long shadow cast 
by three related considerations: 1) the constraints on the tort action provided as an 
optional remedy; 2) the fundamental structure of common law tort rules; and 3) the 
September 11 events themselves. 
Consider initially the constraints on the tort remedy enacted along with the Fund. 
As mentioned earlier, this statutory tort action replacing common law tort rights 
(albeit adopting common law substantive tort principles) capped tort at insurance 
limits against virtually all potential defendants.69  As a practical matter, this was 
taken to mean that recovery under the tort option, if it were exercised, might be 
severely limited after all the outside property damage claims (which of necessity 
would be brought in tort) were aggregated with personal injury claims – $1.5 billion 
per air carrier, it was thought, would soon be exceeded.70  To the extent that this 
perception was accurate, it created pressure for a no-fault option sufficiently robust 
to avoid coercing claimants into substantially diminished recoveries in tort.   
Related to this point, as the next section will indicate, even the watered-down 
version of tort was by no means clearly an available option.  The applicable common 
law rules required a considerable stretch to provide a remedy to victims in the World 
Trade Center; and as far as passengers on the flights were concerned, negligence of 
the carriers and baggage inspectors – let alone more attenuated defendants – was 
anything but a foregone conclusion.71   
                                                                
66See Williamson v. Plant Insulation Co., 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 751 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994). 
67Final Rule, supra note 49, § 104.44. 
68Interim Final Rule, supra note 48, § 104.44; Final Rule, supra 49, § 104.44. 
69See supra notes 36-37, and accompanying text. 
70See Lizette Alvarez & Stephen Labaton, A Nation Challenged: The Bailout; An Airline 
Bailout, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2001, at A1; Mary Jacoby, Lawyers Say Suits May Benefit 
Clients, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 15, 2001, at 1A; Bob Van Voris, Lawyers Take Over 
Ground Zero, NAT’L L.J., Mar. 11, 2002. 
71See discussion infra Part IV. 
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Finally, the event itself cast a long shadow.  No one would rest easily with 
coercing the surviving families into a long, drawn-out pursuit of recovery in tort, 
given the special sympathy for their plight.  
In view of these factors, the Special Master’s strategy emerges and becomes 
apparent: Edge up closely enough to the range of tort compensation to make no-fault 
benefits under the Fund an offer that could not be refused by most eligible parties.  
Note that this is a very different set of motivations than one ordinarily finds 
underlying no-fault systems.  Workers’ compensation, auto no-fault, black lung 
benefits for coal miners, and virtually every other system of no-fault, 
unapologetically provide a form of social insurance against risk; they are not fraught 
with symbolic significance associated with heroism and patriotic feelings. 
IV.  THE TORT OPTION 
As indicated earlier, a potential claimant under the Fund is put to a choice: An 
eligible party can claim benefits under the Fund and waive tort, or opt out of the 
Fund and take one’s chances in tort.72  In the Final Rule, the Special Master makes it 
somewhat less of a stark proposition by providing that claimants can get “ballpark 
estimates” of recovery under the Fund before deciding whether to waive any claim 
for no-fault benefits.73  But once the tort option is chosen, the claimant takes tort on 
its own terms. 
In fact, tort claimants are channeled into a system that might involve taking tort 
on less than its ordinary terms, because the pool of available funds – given the cap on 
liability at insurance limits and the non-Fund-eligible claims for property loss – may 
very well yield what mass tort observers refer to as a “limited fund.”74   
Liability limits aside, what are the prospects in tort?  Consider first the airline 
passengers.  Ordinarily, air crash cases are settled relatively quickly.  But there is 
nothing ordinary about the circumstances of September 11.  Can negligence be 
established against the airlines?  Perhaps, by arguing a failure to secure the cockpits 
adequately, or asserting that there was inadequate screening for dangerous objects – 
although the latter would require extending vicarious liability to the airlines for 
alleged negligence of the security screeners, who were at least formally independent 
contractors. 
The inspector/screeners could of course be sued directly, and their liability in fact 
is not capped under the statutorily established tort remedy.  But their solvency is in 
question; and here too establishing negligence would be somewhat problematic.  The 
box cutters carried onto the planes and apparently used as the principal weapons by 
the terrorists, for example, were not clearly in violation of FAA regulations.75 
The terrorist acts raise an independent issue in tort, creating the prospect of a 
defense claim of no proximate cause, because they could be taken to be 
                                                                
72See supra Part II.C. 
73Warily Circling the Sept. 11 Fund, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2002, at A26. 
74See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(B). 
75Shelley Murphy, America Attacks: Impact on New England; Logan’s Baggage Screeners 
Defended Workers Unfairly Blamed, Company Supervisor Says, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 10, 
2001, at B1; Jonathan Eig, Affixing the Blame for Sept. 11 Loss: A Widow’s Choice, WALL ST. 
J., Sept. 11, 2002, at A1. 
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unforeseeable acts and consequently as intervening misconduct that cut off the 
liability of both the airlines and the screeners.  None of these issues is sufficiently 
clear to avoid the strong prospect of protracted and uncertain litigation before a jury. 
If anything, claims on behalf of the building occupants and rescuers rest on even 
less firm ground.  Here, the case against the airlines and security personnel is a 
substantial step further removed in terms of foreseeability, making it likely that 
proximate cause requirements would be very difficult to satisfy.  Indeed, it is 
correlatively less clear that the case would survive summary judgment in the first 
instance.  It would be possible, of course, to sue instead (or in addition) the building 
owner and perhaps various building contractors and parties involved in the design 
and construction of the World Trade Center.  On this score, once again, there is a 
threshold issue of negligence that must be satisfied, as well as a related question of 
cause in fact; in other words, would even a non-negligent design have withstood the 
impact of the massive collision and incineration?  The early reports and studies are 
inconclusive at best.76 
In short, the prospects of establishing claims in tort are far from certain.  
Nonetheless, whatever the risks in tort, comprehensive analysis requires assessment 
of the benefits as well.  These are relatively familiar; in tort, there would be no 
scheduling of economic or non-economic loss, juries would be relatively 
unconstrained, and the background events seem to assure a strong measure of 
underlying sympathy for the plaintiffs.   
Depending on the applicable state law, there might not be collateral source 
offsets; and certainly even in less generous jurisdictions there would be no offsets for 
pensions and life insurance.77  Similarly, punitive damages would not be barred (as 
by the Act78), although in view of the attenuated case for negligence and proximate 
cause the likelihood of anything beyond compensatory damages seems small. 
Thus, if liability in tort could be established, damages would likely be higher than 
under the Fund, particularly for very high-wage earners and those who had highly 
promising future job prospects.  But once again, there is the limit on aggregate 
damages under the Fund to take into account, and the time value of comparative 
awards.  
Presumably, recovery under the Fund would be far quicker and subject to far 
lower litigation costs than recovery in tort, even if the latter were ultimately 
successful.  In the end, recourse to tort is subject to a sufficient number of potential 
pitfalls and limitations to make the Fund option appear more attractive, on its face, 
for most claimants. 
V.  A MODEL FOR THE FUTURE? 
At the outset, I noted that when tragedy strikes, victims ordinarily look to the tort 
system for redress as long as there is a potentially responsible party.  Is the tragedy 
                                                                
76See James Glanz & Eric Lipton, Expert Report Disputes U.S. on Collapse, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 22, 2002 at B1.  See also, Report on Towers’ Collapse Ends Mostly in Questions, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 1, 2002, at C18. 
77New York does recognize collateral offsets by statute, but not for life insurance.  See 
N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 4545 (McKinney 2002) (requiring collateral source offsets but excepting life 
insurance and certain other collateral sources such as social security benefits). 
78Air Transportation Safety Act § 405(b)(5). 
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of September 11, and the adoption of the Victim Compensation Fund, likely to 
trigger a shift in social attitudes towards no-fault compensation of those injured or 
killed by random tragic events?  Put aside terrorist activities for the moment.  
Scaffolding falls unexpectedly from a tall building onto a busy street, crushing the 
unsuspecting driver and passenger in a passing automobile.79  For the victims, there 
is no government compensation plan, other than Social Security benefits, to provide 
economic assistance to the surviving family even if the potential defendants are 
insolvent so that tort is not a realistic option. 
These “Acts of God,” or of randomly careless and/or irresponsible parties, occur 
and will continue to occur episodically.  As a society, we deeply empathize, for the 
moment, with the plight of the victims and survivors.  But soon we go about our 
lives, depending on existing private insurance mechanisms and tort, if the 
circumstances are right, to provide compensation.  Where tort is applicable, we 
depend on it, in part, to promote deterrence of similar risk-generating conduct in the 
future.  It seems highly unlikely that anything coming out of September 11 will alter 
this pattern of expectations and systematic arrangements in the direction of a broad-
based no-fault compensation scheme. 
But what about random terrorist activities: Is the September 11 no-fault scheme 
likely to provide a blueprint for future responses to such events?  The similarities of 
September 11, albeit on a smaller scale of human carnage, to the Oklahoma City 
bombing and the earlier World Trade Center terrorist incident, among others, were 
not lost on observers; critics soon raised fairness concerns about awarding benefits to 
September 11 survivors when no such scheme was in place or enacted after the fact 
for the victims of earlier terrorism against the nation.80  In part, this concern may 
now be addressed retroactively.81  Still, there is no systematic governmental effort to 
identify victims of past terrorist attacks and incorporate them in a scheme resembling 
the Victim Compensation Fund. 
Nonetheless, it is one thing to tolerate differential treatment of events that have 
already transpired.  It is quite another to ignore parallels if the nightmare of an event 
roughly similar in character to September 11 were to occur again in the near future.  
It seems highly unlikely that victims of a like attack on commercial high rises in or 
outside of New York, in the near future, would not be incorporated under an 
amended version of the Victim Compensation Plan.  All the same, looking to the 
longer-term future, it seems premature to predict whether such a scheme, or one 
grounded in a more traditional social welfare, needs-based economic loss model, will 
be adopted down the road.  That depends, in significant part, on how satisfied we are, 
from the perspectives of fairness and cost, with the implementation of the Victim 
Compensation Plan itself, which is just getting under way. 
                                                                
79See Gary Washburn, Jeremy Manier, & Crystal Yednak, Permits Key in Scaffolding 
Probe; Officials Unsure Who’s Responsible for Issuing Them, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 12, 2002, at 
N1. 
80Oklahomans Questioning Sept. 11 Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2001, at B8.  
81See David W. Chen, Many Relatives, Wary and Anguished, Shun Sept. 11 Fund, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 1, 2002, at B1 (noting that the House passed legislation that would make 
American victims of the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings in Africa eligible for compensation 
from the Fund and that some senators were also seeking to expand the Fund’s scope to include 
victims of the 1993 World Trade Center and the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing). 
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One can hope that we never face terrorism on a massive scale again.  If instead 
we confront the also-grim prospect of an occasional random, small-scale loss of life 
at the hands of terrorists, it seems more likely that tort will remain our first-order 
systemic response – just as it is presently when a scaffold falls from a building or a 
plane from the sky, and the lives of the unfortunate victims and surviving families 
are altered forever.  In the end, tort has demonstrated remarkable staying power.  By 
contrast, government intervention to provide no-fault benefits remains a chancier 
proposition, and, at this point, an approach that fails to be grounded in a broader 
social consensus about what fairness and justice require. 
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